Recently, some foreign media have been vigorously hyping up the theory of China's overcapacity. Yellen, the US Treasury Secretary and expert official known as an outstanding economist, repeatedly mentioned "China's overcapacity" before and after his visit to China, and clearly pointed to emerging fields such as electric vehicles, photovoltaics, and new energy. He believed that the Chinese government's subsidies in related fields distorted factor and product prices, caused resource mismatches, and impacted global supply chains and markets. The arguments of some media and politicians in the United States reflect the suppression of academic logic based on empirical rationality by the hegemonic logic of power politics in the country, demonstrating the expulsion of principle politics as "good currency" by interest politics as "bad currency". On the one hand, the United States is increasing subsidies worth trillions of dollars to the domestic clean energy industry; On the other hand, it demands that China retract its industrial policies through both soft and hard measures, claiming that China's production and export of cheap green energy technologies not only pose a security threat to the West, but also backfire on itself, ultimately making Chinese banks and the government pay for it. The confusion of "subsidies are harmful, please let them go, let me do it" reflects that the United States appears to be concerned about China's "overcapacity" on the surface, but is actually anxious about whether it can "compete" with China. The Biden administration's National Security Strategy report clearly regards winning against China as its main strategic goal, and the rise of China's advantageous production capacity in emerging fields will largely overshadow this goal. From a total perspective, there is currently no universally significant overcapacity in China. In human history, especially since the rise of capitalism, the problem of overcapacity has indeed caused serious impacts on the economy and society, creating enormous difficulties and tragedies for people's production and life. For example, according to the American social documentary masterpiece Glory and Dreams, during the Great Depression, capitalists had people dump unsold surplus milk into the sewer. At the same time, 3000 starving men and women attempted to protest outside the Ford factory in Michigan. Police opened fire to disperse, resulting in 4 deaths and 100 injuries. The injured were also handcuffed to hospital beds and charged with riot. The real overcapacity is not the imbalance between supply and demand in individual industries for a certain period of time, but the result of various or major sectors experiencing vicious market competition, expanding industry losses, unemployment of enterprise employees, increasing non-performing assets in banks, exacerbating energy resource bottlenecks, and deteriorating ecological environment. This is clearly not the reality in China today. For example, in March of this year, the urban survey unemployment rate in China was 5.3%, a decrease of 0.1 percentage points from February, and lower than the average monthly unemployment rate of the past five years. It has remained below the average level for 12 consecutive months. This means that even if there are industries in China where some production capacity exceeds demand, the labor force released from competition failures and restructuring can relatively easily enter other enterprises or industries with higher productivity and competitiveness in an orderly manner - they are still needed by a resilient economic system, so why say there is "excess"? From the perspective of emerging fields, there is currently no overcapacity in China. Under the conditions of economic globalization, a country's significant exports in certain areas do not necessarily mean overcapacity in these areas, but rather a manifestation of its comparative advantage in these areas. By exporting a large number of advantageous products and services