Constructing the theoretical system of "campaign structure" with Chinese military characteristics ■ sun Jingwei Editor's note The principle that "campaign structure" rather than "campaign elements" directly determine the victory or defeat of a campaign reveals the principle that the inferior wins the superior in a campaign. Those with inferior strength can win through efforts and by forming a "battle structure" beneficial to themselves. However, those who have strength advantages may also fail if they cannot transform their strength advantages into a "battle structure" beneficial to themselves. Under the condition of informatization, facing the great changes of strategic background, weapons and equipment, combat objects and battlefield environment, we need to build a new theoretical system of "campaign structure" with our military characteristics in order to occupy the battlefield initiative and win victory. What is "campaign structure" The "campaign structure" mentioned in this paper refers to the number and style of a series of corps battles and larger-scale operations contained in the campaign, as well as their relationship in purpose, time and space. Any campaign must involve a certain number of corps battles or larger-scale operations, and these actions are necessarily related in purpose, time and space. For example, the Liaoshen campaign included Tashan resistance, Heishan resistance and Jinzhou fortified battle. In terms of purpose, Tashan and Heishan Resistance War is to ensure the capture of Jinzhou; In terms of time, the two resistance battles must be carried out until Jinzhou's crucial battle is won; In space, the two blocking battles must block the enemy's assistance at a certain distance from Jinzhou to prevent the enemy's assistance from interfering with our occupation of Jinzhou. Modern campaigns also include a series of corps battles and larger-scale operations, as well as the inevitable links between them. If the action of controlling information power can ensure the success of the action of controlling air power, there will be no air power without controlling information power; Air supremacy action can ensure the success of sea supremacy action. Without air supremacy, there is no sea supremacy; Competing for the "three rights" action can ensure the success of other actions. Without the "three rights" as a guarantee, other actions will be difficult to succeed. Everything has its special structure. A series of corps and larger operations and their relationship are the unique structure of the campaign. It is the secret of victory to deal with the enemy with a "campaign structure" that is beneficial to oneself "Campaign structure" determines the outcome of a campaign, and leads and regulates many things, such as campaign command, campaign coordination, campaign support and so on. To win the battle, we should do at least two things: first, choose a series of actions beneficial to ourselves, such as combat, assault and mobility, as the "basic particles" of the battle; Second, correctly design the relationship between a series of combat operations in purpose, time and space, so that they can cooperate and support each other. At any time, the nature of combat operations faced by an army is diverse, and the relationship between a series of combat operations is also diverse. Choosing a "campaign structure" that is beneficial to oneself is the key to the implementation of war and campaign guidance. For example, during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, there were many kinds of battles, raids and maneuvers in our army, such as the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising; Urban operations, such as attacking Changsha and Ganzhou; Operations in the nature of positional defense, such as the Guangchang defense war in the fifth anti "encirclement and suppression" operation in the Central Soviet Area; Guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, such as many battles in the first to fourth counter "encirclement and suppression" operations in the Central Soviet area. Choosing what kind of "campaign structure" has become the key to "winning the war" in the period of our Red Army. According to the objective reality that our army had few personnel, poor equipment, lack of necessary firepower damage ability and did not have an advantage in positional attack and defense, urban attack and defense and other battles in the Jinggangshan period, Mao Zedong creatively combined a series of small-scale assault, sneak attack, rush attack and other battle styles. When the enemy was unprepared, Mao Zedong won a series of victories against "advance suppression" and "joint suppression" in the Jinggangshan period. In the period of Western Fujian, in view of the current situation that our army has developed to tens of thousands, has guerrilla warfare experience, and the base area has been expanded to a considerable scale, we creatively combined a series of ambush, encounter, rush attack and other mobile warfare operations of regular corps into campaigns, and won the victory of the first to fourth anti "encirclement and suppression" operations in the Central Soviet area. After the long march arrived in Yan'an, Mao Zedong made a systematic theoretical summary and put forward the concept of "combat form". The core connotation of this concept is to choose the nature of "campaign structure". Under the guidance of this theory, our army chose the "campaign structure" of guerrilla warfare in the Anti Japanese War; In the war of liberation, our army chose the "campaign structure" of mobile warfare; In the early stage of the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea, our army created a "campaign structure" of mobile warfare that is not far away from the position, and later created a "campaign structure" of solid position defense based on tunnels. These "campaign structures" were based on the objective reality at that time and combined a series of combat, assault, mobility and other actions that were beneficial to our country from the point of giving play to our army's advantages and weakening the enemy's advantages. In decades of war practice, the key to our army's ability to win over the superior with the inferior and defeat all kinds of strong enemies is to choose a "campaign structure" that is beneficial to us. Under the condition of informatization, great changes have taken place in the strategic background, weapons and equipment, combat objects and battlefield environment of our army's operations, and many new combat, assault and mobility styles have emerged under the background of integrated joint operations. In the complicated new operational patterns, we need to clarify two questions: first, which operational actions are beneficial to us under the new situation; The second is how to select the combat actions that are beneficial to China to form a campaign, so that a series of combat actions can cooperate and support each other. Constructing the theoretical system of "campaign structure" with our army's characteristics will help to improve the ability to fight and win What is the ability to fight and win? Starting from the conclusion that "the victory or defeat of a campaign is directly determined by the 'campaign structure', the ability to fight and win a war is reflected in three links: first, in the campaign planning stage, commanders should have the ability to plan a" campaign structure "that is beneficial to themselves according to the actual situation of the enemy, the battlefield environment and our situation; Second, in the course of confrontation, commanders should have the ability to use various means of creating momentum, such as concealing the truth and showing the false, to cause and make use of the enemy's mistakes and form a "campaign structure" beneficial to themselves; Third, after the campaign starts, the troops should have the ability to win a series of combat operations that have been formed. The above three capabilities need to be obtained by constructing the theoretical system of our army's characteristic "campaign structure". First of all, it is necessary to demonstrate the nature of combat, assault, mobility and other actions that our army must and can carry out under the condition of informatization, what forces these actions need, what action procedures to take, and what operational objectives can be achieved, so as to build a tactical theory system with our army's characteristics. With this theory, we can find out the shortcomings of our army at the combat level and know whether we can win all kinds of combat operations. Secondly, we should study the combination methods of a series of actions such as combat, assault and mobility. That is, which should be carried out first and which should be carried out later, demonstrate the cooperation relationship of a series of combat operations in purpose, time and space, and form a theoretical system of "campaign structure" with the characteristics of our army. With this theory, we can have a clear idea of the shortcomings of our army at the campaign level, how to use campaign strength, how to arrange troops and how to make high-quality campaign determination. In the process of planning and conducting a campaign, we should study what kind of "structure and method" the commander should use, and what kind of "command structure and method" should be formed. With this theory, there is a basis for the cultivation of campaign planning and command ability. The construction of the above theoretical system can cultivate the ability of planning war for campaign commanders and command organs, and can train the ability of winning a series of combat operations in actual combat for troops. In a word, any army that can recruit and fight well in history must be supported by its own combat theory. In the war years, the reason why our army could defeat strong enemies repeatedly was that it was guided by the characteristic theories of "guerrilla warfare" and "mobile warfare". Today, only by building a combat theory with the characteristics of our army can we implement the requirements of being able to fight and win. This theory must answer the following questions: first, what kind of combat, assault, mobility and other actions will our army's future campaigns include. Based on the data of weapon test and combat experiment, we should make quantitative and qualitative analysis on the forces, combat space and duration, possible action procedures, possible losses and possible outcomes of both sides, and establish a technical and tactical database. The second is to answer well what purpose, space and time relationship the above-mentioned series of operations should be combined to form a campaign as a whole in various campaign styles. The third is to answer the logical methods of campaign commanders and commanding organs in the process of planning campaigns, as well as the working procedures, contents and standards based on this logical method. The fourth is to answer what means can be used to form the "campaign structure" needed by our own side under the condition of confrontation. (outlook new era)