A small number of leading cadres take advantage of their positions to operate secretly, eat interest spreads and transfer interests Strictly prevent state-owned platform companies from becoming hotbeds of corruption Han Yadong, Xue Peng, website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the State Supervision Commission The Commission for Discipline Inspection and supervision of Chun'an County, Zhejiang Province strengthened the supervision of state-owned investment and financing platform companies such as urban construction and transportation investment, analyzed and judged the risk of clean government according to the characteristics of the industry, carried out targeted and accurate supervision, and strictly investigated the problems of Party members and cadres intervening in engineering projects and illegal related party transactions. The picture shows that the discipline inspection and supervision cadres of the county and the Discipline Inspection Commission of the communications and investment group jointly went to the national highway construction site to supervise and understand the relevant situation. Photographed by Mao Yongfeng On January 5, 2022, Sichuan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision announced that Luo Yi, member of the Party committee and director of Sichuan Energy Investment Group Co., Ltd., was subject to review and investigation; On December 1, 2021, Guangdong Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and supervision released the news that Wang Gang, former deputy secretary of the Party committee and general manager of Guangdong Railway Construction Investment Group Co., Ltd., was "double opened"; On November 30, 2021, Gansu Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision announced that Liu Xiaoli, former member of the Party committee and deputy general manager of Gansu Electric Power Investment Group Co., Ltd., had been expelled from the party... Recently, the discipline inspection and supervision organs continued to report typical cases, releasing a clear signal of resolutely investigating and dealing with new corruption cases involving the use of state-owned investment and financing platform companies to transfer interests. In recent years, many provinces, cities and counties have established local state-owned platform companies such as "urban investment", "transportation investment", "water investment" and "culture and tourism investment", which have played an important role in local economic development. However, some platform companies deviated from the original intention of establishment, and some took advantage of the owner's advantages of government projects, preferential policies and centralized funds to operate secretly in project contracting; Some take kickbacks and spreads in the process of financing and borrowing; Some use their identity to contract at a low price and lease at a high price in land consolidation and management. The Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out that we should clearly see the problems of "intertwined traditional corruption and new corruption". Discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels earnestly strengthen the research on new situations and problems of state-owned investment and financing platform companies, break up the investigated cases to see the lack of system, responsibility and supervision, take targeted measures, timely find and investigate and deal with relevant problems through special inspections, so as to promote the platform companies to continuously improve their governance structure, Prevent the platform company from becoming a hotbed of corruption and prevent integrity risks, debt risks, financial risks and social risks. The general manager regarded the urban investment company as his own "small vegetable garden", and took bribes of more than 35 million yuan for more than seven years, involving many urban construction projects such as shed reform Boxes were opened and piles of cash appeared in front of the investigators: the banknotes neatly packed and stacked were basically not opened, and some banknotes had become moldy due to long-term storage. After counting, a total of 15 such boxes were stored in three different places, with a total amount of more than 35 million yuan... This scene occurred during the investigation of Zhang Han'an case by Shaanxi discipline inspection and supervision organ. Zhang Han'an, former director of Hanzhong urban investment office and former general manager of Hanzhong Urban Construction Investment Development Co., Ltd., Shaanxi Province, was "double opened" in January 2020. Later, he was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 12 years and 6 months and fined 2 million yuan for committing the crime of bribery in the first instance. After investigation, Zhang Han'an received more than 35 million yuan in bribes in more than seven years of working in the urban investment company. Hanzhong urban investment company is an investment and financing company that organizes and manages Hanzhong urban infrastructure construction and project development. It is responsible for the annual investment and construction plan of major development projects in Hanzhong, reviews the construction project scheme, planning and design, and organizes the construction of key infrastructure projects in the city. It is a state-owned investment and financing platform company. During Zhang Han'an's tenure in the municipal urban investment company, it was a period when Hanzhong accelerated the West expansion of the central urban area and a number of major projects were launched in an all-round way. Among them, the urban investment company was responsible for organizing the implementation of important projects such as the construction of Longgang new area, urban roads and shed reconstruction projects. As the "top leader" of the company, Zhang Han'an is arbitrary in the decision-making and selection, bidding and fund use of major projects, and often makes decisions on project decision-making and development, bidding and fund allocation. "The bosses of large enterprises and private enterprises ask for me and often hold banquets. They are prone to famous cigarettes and wines and high-end hotels and clubs. Over time, I get used to it and feel it's right..." in the communication with the merchant boss, the thought of seeking pleasure secretly grows in Zhang Han'an's heart, Gradually, there are some wrong ideas, such as "it's natural to get rewards for doing things for others", "my ability is not poor, and my income should keep up". Therefore, in addition to frequently drinking with the merchant boss and pushing cups for lamps, Zhang Han'an began to wantonly accept gifts and gifts, from high-end drinks to high-end cameras, from gold and silver products to cash consumption cards. With the fall of the ideological dam, Zhang Han'an's door to corruption has opened wider and wider, and he has become more and more arbitrary in company affairs. He can't listen to any different opinions. He often puts aside collective decision-making and supervision and works hard on projects. Zhang Han'an repeatedly approved construction projects in violation of regulations: in a shantytown reconstruction project, he received 11.5 million yuan to help a construction company and individuals enter the site for construction and successfully win the bid; After receiving 2 million yuan from a partner of a company, ask the financial personnel of the urban investment company to suspend the collection of the debts owed by the company; After receiving the "thank you fee" of 4.5 million yuan sent by the contractor, arrange the financial personnel of the urban investment company to pay the project payment. Zhang Han'an was eager for quick success and instant benefits in project construction. Regardless of the company's capital bearing capacity, he blindly borrowed money, spread stalls and went on the project, causing a chain reaction. During his tenure, he launched 39 projects, including 11 projects under construction, with an estimated total investment of about 10.46 billion yuan and a capital gap of 7.534 billion yuan. In order to make up for the capital gap, Zhang Han'an adopted the methods of mortgage loans from banks, high interest loans from private enterprises, and solving the financial problems of old projects with new projects, resulting in high debt of the company, suspension or suspension of many projects such as shanty town reconstruction, and people's continuous petition for demolition and resettlement, wage arrears and other problems. According to the investigators, Zhang Han'an acted recklessly and was willing to be "hunted", provided help to illegal businessmen in major project decision-making, bidding and fund allocation, and accepted up to 110 bribes. "Zhang Han'an's bribery involves many projects, many times and large amount. It is the largest case of violation of discipline and law since the establishment of Hanzhong City. The social impact is extremely bad and the lesson is very profound." During the examination and investigation, Zhang Han'an reflected: "I regard the urban investment company as my own 'small vegetable garden', regardless of public and private, wantonly reach out, and develop from half pushing at the beginning to no rejection of visitors. It's really shameful and shameless to think of it." State owned investment and financing platform companies are rich in development resources, many construction projects and large amount of funds, and new corruption cases using them to transfer interests occur frequently Local government investment and financing platform refers to an economic entity established by local governments and their departments and institutions through financial allocation or injection of land, equity and other assets, which undertakes the financing function of government investment projects and has independent legal personality. The platform company is mainly responsible for financing and construction, that is, raising funds for local economic and social development, and undertaking the specific construction tasks of infrastructure construction and public service projects. As a financing method, local financing platform helps to solve the financing problems of local government departments and promote local infrastructure construction and economic and social development. But at the same time, some state-owned investment and financing platform companies are not standardized in management and supervision, making state-owned assets the "Tang Monk meat" of individual corrupt elements. Some take advantage of the company's advantages in government projects, policy preference, fund concentration and so on to operate secretly in project contracting. Luo Xusheng, former general manager of Hangzhou Industrial Investment Group Co., Ltd., engaged in interest exchange in a large complex project and accepted millions of yuan in bribes. In order to thank Luo Xusheng for his care in construction, project coordination and cost settlement, pan, the project contractor, successively gave him 300000 yuan in cash and then 3% of his company's shares, which was worth more than 4.24 million yuan at that time. Zhou Zhong, former chairman of Jinjiang District Urban Investment Company in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, took advantage of his position to charge a "thank you fee" after contracting out a greening and road maintenance project in Jinjiang to a specific stakeholder. Some have rebates and spreads in the process of financing and borrowing. Zhou Yong'an, former chairman of Longmen ancient town development and Construction Co., Ltd. in Nanchong City, Sichuan Province, illegally lent state-owned enterprise funds to private enterprises and individuals, charged interest at an annual interest rate ranging from 5% to 20%, totaling more than 80 million yuan and accepted bribes of more than 1.4 million yuan. In Zhou Zhong's case, he did not perform the "three important and one big" procedure in the financing link. When the financial personnel reminded the risk and refused to sign, he still decided to lend the bank loan funds to other units. In addition, others use the identity of ordinary farmers to contract at low prices and lease at high prices in land consolidation business. In some counties, 70% of the corruption cases investigated in 2020 occurred in platform companies. Liu Jiacong, member of the Standing Committee of Jinjiang District Party committee, Secretary of the District Commission for Discipline Inspection and director of the supervision committee of Chengdu, believes that state-owned investment and financing platform companies such as "urban investment" and "agricultural investment" are both financing subjects and construction subjects, with wide business scope and long business chain, showing the characteristics of large amount of funds, large number of projects and strong professionalism. The main person in charge of the company has highly centralized functions and powers, extensive social exchanges, a large number of communication objects, and high risk of being "hunted". Once there is no effective supervision and restriction, it is very easy to breed corruption. For more than 3 years, the Party committee secretary and the Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission have not been provided, and the collective decision-making of the leading group has been replaced by individual decision-making. Relevant corruption cases have exposed the lack of system, responsibility and supervision of some units "The 'top leaders' of state-owned investment and financing platform companies can mobilize a lot of resources, concentrate their power, but receive little supervision and restriction." Liu Jiacong told reporters that analyzing relevant cases, the problems exposed in the lack of system, responsibility and supervision are thought-provoking, alarming and urgent to be solved. The loopholes in the system of "closing the cat in the bullpen" have led some people to frequently cross the red line. As local state-owned enterprises, state-owned investment and financing platform companies have generally established corporate governance structure, but the internal power operation mechanism and supervision mechanism of some enterprises are not perfect. The division of functions and powers of internal decision-making bodies such as the Party committee, the shareholders' meeting and the board of directors is not clear enough; The performance of supervisory duties by the board of supervisors or independent external supervisors is a mere formality. The board of supervisors can not hold several meetings a year. Individual supervisors are absent for a long time and can not be supplemented in time. The rules and regulations formulated by the company are often more principled norms, less operational rules and regulations, and even less rules for accountability. According to the investigators of Zhang Han'an case, Hanzhong urban investment company has not established a discussion system and decision-making procedures, and there is no clear provision on what matters should be decided through what procedures. After Zhang Han'an took office in the company, he often replaced the collective decision-making of the leading group with individual decisions on major matters such as project development, land transfer, institutional setting and personnel adjustment. In order to avoid supervision, Zhang Han'an even transferred the staff of the planning and development department, contract cost department, engineering department, project development department and other departments one after another on the grounds of improving work efficiency, resulting in the inability of the regulatory department to perform its duties. After the incident, Zhang Han'an analyzed: "I put aside the collective decision-making and regulatory departments and stubbornly started the project. Slowly, it appeared that the project was built before approval