The NATO Washington Summit is about to be held on the 9th. Although US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared this to be "the most ambitious summit since the end of the cold war", NATO is facing profound "internal and external problems" on its 75th anniversary. The prolonged quagmire of geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the uncertainty of the US election prospects have cast a shadow over this summit. As the main allies of the United States in the Asia Pacific region, leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have been invited to attend for the third consecutive year. However, the absence of Australian Prime Minister Albanese's announcement has poured cold water into the Biden administration's efforts to demonstrate its global alliance of "great unity". According to the information disclosed before the meeting, the summit will focus on discussing three major issues: first, the Ukrainian issue, including aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's accession to NATO; The second is to strengthen defense and deterrence capabilities; The third is to deepen cooperation with NATO's partners in the Indo Pacific region. But all of this is subject to many variables in the face of NATO's internal and external troubles. As a political and military alliance that upholds the concept of collective security, establishing a common external threat is a necessary condition for the survival of NATO. NATO's role should have ended with the end of the Cold War, but driven by the values and interests of the United States in maintaining its unipolar hegemony, NATO continued to survive by constantly creating new "opponents". Five years ago, due to the wavering leadership role of the United States and increased uncertainty in foreign policy, a series of tensions and disagreements emerged within NATO, especially among European members who lacked internal strategic coordination. As a result, French President Macron repeatedly expressed the view that NATO was "brain dead". The Ukrainian crisis seems to have given NATO a shot in the arm, re consolidating its internal consensus and achieving new expansion. It is puzzling that NATO seems not to be in a hurry to prioritize resolving the geopolitical crisis around it, but rather to impatiently extend its reach to the Asia Pacific region. At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO positioned China as a "systemic challenge" in its strategic vision, demonstrating its strategic direction to contain China. Under the command of the United States' Indo Pacific strategy, NATO has strengthened its military presence in the Asia Pacific region. NATO countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and Canada have continuously sent ships and aircraft to participate in multilateral joint exercises in the Asia Pacific region. Leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have also attended NATO summits for two consecutive years, and have strengthened military and security cooperation with the North under the "Individual Partnership Plan". The convergence of the transatlantic partnership of the United States and the Asia Pacific alliance system in the Indo Pacific region has synchronized the progress of "NATO Asia Pacific" and "NATO Asia Pacific". However, NATO's "Asia Pacific turn" has not fully met the expectations of the United States. On the one hand, NATO's plan to establish a Tokyo liaison office was stalled due to opposition from France; The prolonged crisis in Ukraine has caused some countries to experience fatigue in aiding Ukraine, and Hungary's unique approach to relations with Russia has also caused headaches for NATO senior officials. The political changes in multiple European countries inevitably affect NATO's military investment in the Asia Pacific direction. On the other hand, the four countries in the Asia Pacific region also have their own difficulties, and their integration with NATO faces subjective and objective limitations. In this round of "NATO Asia Pacific" and "Asia Pacific NATO", Japan has played a vanguard and "leading party". However, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's support rate is low, his governance prospects are bleak, and his radical military expansion path is facing multiple constraints both domestically and internationally. After the ruling party of South Korea lost in the parliamentary elections, the government of Yoon Seok yeol also had to make certain adjustments to the "one-sided" diplomatic route towards the United States. Recently, the relationship between China and Australia has improved, and Australia's momentum to contain China has also significantly weakened. Although New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes Alliance, it has always had little interest in interfering with major power competition and geopolitics, and has therefore been regarded by the United States as a "weak link" in the chain of anti China alliances. Nevertheless, the United States and some of its allies still adhere to the Cold War mentality and will continue to layout major power competition and camp confrontation in the Asia Pacific region under the banner of "the security of the Atlantic and Pacific is inseparable" in the future. During Biden's tenure, the United States initially developed a grid based, composite, and nested "small multilateral" alliance system in the Asia Pacific region, especially accelerating the establishment of a joint command and integrated deterrence system with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, making the security structure of the Asia Pacific region increasingly similar to that of NATO. However, from a practical perspective, whether the "Asia Pacific version of NATO" can take shape depends on the next US government's foreign policy orientation and strategic resource investment, and on the other hand, it is more severely constrained by the reality of interest integration and diverse inclusiveness in the Asia Pacific region. Nowadays, China is the primary trading partner of US regional alliances such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, with different parties having different interests and risk tolerance for potential geopolitical conflicts. The attitude of key forces in ASEAN and other regions opposing the "new Cold War" will also create resistance for the development of the "small multilateral" of the United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific region towards a unified collective security architecture. In the short to medium term, it should be difficult for the "Asia Pacific version of NATO" based on NATO style legal provisions and institutional arrangements to emerge. Peace and development remain the main tone of the world, and finding and maintaining a common "imaginary enemy" for all NATO members is not an easy task. For the behemoth of NATO, a series of "complications" brought about by obesity are emerging, and uncontrolled expansion and strategic tentacles will further diversify member interests and increase management and operational costs, ultimately exacerbating the alliance's dilemma of losing both sides. The indecisiveness exhibited by NATO during the "Asia Pacific turn" is a reflection of its predicament. (New Society)