Recently, the discipline inspection and supervision team of Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and supervision stationed in the provincial SASAC urged relevant state-owned enterprises to further improve the internal management system of enterprises and effectively prevent and resolve financial and operational risks in accordance with the newly issued Measures for accountability for illegal operation and investment losses of state-owned enterprises in Hunan Province. The provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and supervision of Changde City has promoted relevant departments to introduce a series of systems, which explicitly prohibit financing agency construction, illegal payment of commissions or consulting fees, and financing with asset liability ratio exceeding the key regulatory line is listed as a special regulatory matter. The Party committee of Hunan rail transit Holding Group Co., Ltd. deeply learned the lessons of Wang Wuliang case, took the case as a mirror, promoted reform with the case, investigated and analyzed the problems and deficiencies existing in the construction of Party style and clean government, and put forward rectification plans and measures. The picture shows that the group held the special topic of "learning from the case and promoting reform with the case" and the accountability and integrity reporting meeting of "one post and two responsibilities" for the construction of Party style and clean government in 2021. Photo by Jiang Wei For some time, there have been many bribery cases in the field of local investment and financing, and some platform companies have a high incidence of illegal financing guarantee, illegal borrowing, illegal debt investment and other problems. In December 2021, the supervision committee of Hunan Provincial Commission for discipline inspection made a public announcement on the eight typical cases of bribery in the investment and financing field investigated and dealt with since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, indicating its firm determination to cut off the "interest chain" of bribery and bribery in the investment and financing field and break the "relationship network" of power and money transactions. The work report of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out that corruption and unhealthy tendencies in engineering construction, financing platforms and other fields should be seriously investigated and dealt with, and problems such as unclear asset base, unclear property right responsibility and ineffective supervision should be promoted and solved. Discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels seriously investigated and dealt with a number of cases of serious violations of discipline and law by the heads of investment and financing platform companies. While maintaining the high-pressure trend of punishing bribery, they seriously investigated and dealt with bribery to form a powerful deterrent. Bribery cases occur frequently in the field of investment and financing. Individual leading cadres take advantage of their positions to provide loans and loan guarantees in violation of regulations, help contract engineering projects, dispose of state-owned assets and pay engineering funds The two financing projects, totaling 1.1 billion yuan, are aimed at this "fat meat" by Cheng Libin, a private enterprise owner from Hunan. In 2016, Cheng Libin asked Xiao man, then general manager of Leiyang economic development and Construction Investment Group Co., Ltd. Xiao Manyuan took advantage of his position to help Cheng Libin participate in the company's financing projects and obtain huge financing service fees. In order to thank Xiao Manyuan for his help, Cheng Libin gave Xiao Manyuan a total of 7.1 million yuan for many times. This is not the case. According to the relevant person in charge of the supervision committee of Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, Huang Ming, former party secretary and chairman of Hunan high tech Venture Capital Group Co., Ltd., has repeatedly provided assistance to businessman Liu Guiping's actual control company in terms of bank loan guarantee and fund lending, and received a large amount of property; Mr. Jiang Fuping, the former Secretary of Hunan provincial Party committee and the former manager of Hunan Provincial Road Surface Engineering Co., Ltd., provided one million vehicles for Hunan Fuping Road Construction Co., Ltd; Yang Wanjun, who once served as the general manager and chairman of Zhangjiajie Huarui state owned Assets Management Co., Ltd., helped Zhu Jiaxiang, the legal representative of Shenzhen Jiyang Hongtong Logistics Co., Ltd., obtain the priority of cooperation, reduce or exempt the auction commission and delay the payment of part of the purchase tax during the disposal of a state-owned assets. He did not hesitate to ask the appraisal company to lower the appraisal price and disclose the auction transaction reserve price. Peng Yanbing, deputy director of the case trial Office of the supervision commission of Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, told reporters that the bribes in the above cases were all private business owners, and the bribes were the main principals or supervisors of investment and financing platform companies. The profit-making matters were mainly manifested in providing loans and loan guarantees to private business owners in violation of regulations, helping private business owners contract engineering projects in violation of regulations, disposing of state-owned assets in violation of regulations, paying engineering funds in violation of regulations, etc, Bribery presents the characteristics of internal and external collusion, huge amount, hidden means, diverse ways and serious harm. The related cases have the problems of intertwined political and economic problems, cross infection of financial risk and financial risk and so on. "From the perspective of bribery, it shows the characteristics of long-term 'hunting', long-term bribery, heavy money opening up, etc. from the perspective of bribery methods, there are direct cash delivery, vehicles delivery, and interest delivery in the name of project profit dividends and 'benefit fees'." Peng Yanbing said. It is reported that some bribers "boiled frogs in warm water" played the card of affection and paid bribes for a long time. For example, from 2006 to 2016, Liu Jiankang, the owner of private enterprise, paid bribes to Wang Wuliang, the former chairman of Hunan rail transit Holding Group Co., Ltd. for 11 consecutive years. Some bulls offered bribes not only to the "number one" of the investment and financing platform company, but also to the person in charge of the Department. For example, private enterprise owner Li Weiguang not only offered bribes to the person in charge of Huaihua Transportation Construction Investment Co., Ltd., but also to Li, the former director of the Engineering Department of the unit; Not only to the investment and financing platform company, but also to the regulatory unit. For example, Zhu Jiaxiang bribed the person in charge of Zhangjiajie Huarui state owned Assets Management Co., Ltd. and the person in charge of Zhangjiajie SASAC, the company's regulatory department. Some bribers pay a lot of money and often send hundreds of thousands of yuan or even millions of yuan at a time. For example, Cheng Libin repeatedly bribed Xiao Manyuan, with a single amount of up to 2 million yuan. The relevant person in charge of the supervision commission of Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection believes that corruption in the field of investment and financing will not only cause the loss of state-owned assets and increase the risk of government investment and financing, but also lead to serious consequences such as potential quality hazards of public construction projects, deterioration of business environment and destruction of political ecology. Some platform companies have imperfect systems, disordered internal management and weak supervision. We must effectively strengthen the supervision of the "top leaders" and tighten the institutional cage of restricting power Investment and financing platform companies control scarce resources such as public funds, land and engineering projects, and some illegal private business owners pay heavy bribes to obtain huge benefits. In the face of collusion and corrosion, the heads of some platform companies provide convenience and seek benefits for private business owners through illegal operation of funds and engineering projects. For example, Yang Shangrong, former chairman of Zhuzhou state investment group, illegally arranged his subordinate companies to provide a loan of 60 million yuan for Chen Gang, the briber. Some platform companies have imperfect systems and disorderly internal management, leaving room for internal and external collusion. The establishment, operation and management of investment and financing platforms are mainly led by local governments. Some platform companies have problems in the development process, such as the lack of separation between government and enterprises, the integration of government and business, the lack of governance structure, difficult market-oriented operation, and inadequate external supervision. In addition, the internal management system of investment and financing platform companies is not perfect or the system implementation is not in place, so there is room for black box operation in their work. This leaves room for both sides of bribery to cooperate inside and outside and collude inside and outside. For example, Wang Wuliang accepted the briber Liu Jiankang's request to help him contract the project. Without bidding, he directly instructed his subordinates to hand over the project with a contract price of more than 40 million yuan to Liu Jiankang's affiliated company for implementation, and allowed him to carry out advanced construction before going through the bidding procedures. Knowing that he had violated relevant regulations, Huang Mingming still provided illegal loan guarantee or illegal loan for Liu Guiping's affiliated enterprises by holding a meeting of the board of directors and greeting the heads of subordinate enterprises. In some units, the implementation of the rules of procedure of the Party committee, the last position of the main leaders, and the "three non direct responsibilities" of the principal posts of the party and government are not in place; The party committees of some units still hold meetings and issue documents on the construction of Party style and clean government, and the main leaders of the party committees do not carry out daily reminder conversations with the heads of their subordinate enterprises (Institutions), often ringing the alarm of clean government; In some units, the Secretary of the Party committee and the Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection are short of posts for a long time, and the supervision is weak, resulting in the recklessness and boldness of the "top leaders" of individual platform companies. For example, Lin ganlei, the former manager of Yiyang Anhua County urban construction investment and Development Co., Ltd., was overbearing. When the personnel of the asset management department of the county investment company proposed that an underground parking lot was not a high-quality asset and did not propose to purchase it, they made illegal decisions and decided to purchase it by taking advantage of the "number one" status of the city investment company. The relevant person in charge of the supervision committee of Hunan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out that the investment and financing platform is a "enrichment area" with relatively concentrated public resources such as capital, land, equity and engineering projects. On the one hand, such platforms are deeply involved in or directly responsible for the project approval of government public welfare infrastructure projects, occupying a lot of public resources. On the other hand, they are applicable to the enterprise system and mechanism, but they have not established a perfect modern enterprise system and corporate governance structure, and lack strict supervision and management, resulting in the high concentration of the power of the "top leaders". In this regard, we must earnestly implement the relevant requirements of the "opinions of the CPC Central Committee on strengthening the supervision of the" top leaders "and the leading group", earnestly strengthen the supervision of the "top leaders" and tighten the institutional cage of restricting power. Adhere to the problem orientation and promote the investment and financing platform to solve the problems such as unclear asset base, unclear property right responsibility and ineffective supervision The case shows that individual investment and financing platforms have long had problems such as indiscriminate government and enterprises, unclear responsibilities and rights, non-standard operation, opaque operation and inadequate supervision, which provides a large space for power rent-seeking. We must adhere to the problem orientation and vigorously promote the investment and financing platform to solve the problems such as unclear asset base, unclear property right responsibility and ineffective supervision. Find out the asset base. After the Huang Ming case, Hunan high tech venture capital group improved financial control mechanisms such as financial informatization, comprehensive budget management, appointment system of financial principals, centralized and overall management of funds, etc. Large accounting firms were hired to carry out more than 20 special audits of asset management, focusing on the comprehensive management of assets with large volume and complex ownership relationship. Implement the quarterly economic operation analysis system, disclose the financial situation of the group to all cadres and workers, and accept the supervision of cadres and the masses. Through a series of measures, we should make sure that the asset base is clear. Clarify property rights and responsibilities. Hunan hi tech venture capital group plays the role of equity link and constructs a governance model dominated by capital management. Improve the modern corporate governance structure at the level of group and secondary companies, and the party organization, board of directors and managers shall bear corresponding responsibilities according to the scope of rights and responsibilities. Implement the authorization management of secondary companies and scientifically set up the list of rights and responsibilities. Implement classified management, and mainly perform the responsibilities of shareholders and bear corresponding responsibilities for the projects under the strategic control of the group; For financial investment projects, actively empower and enhance the value of the project. Strengthen supervision and ask for efficiency. After Wang Wuliang's case, Hunan rail transit Holding Group Co., Ltd. transferred professionals from discipline inspection, audit, risk control, finance, operation and other departments to supervise the construction projects such as real estate, magnetic levitation brigade and business logistics, land acquisition and demolition of railway companies with heavy construction tasks, large capital volume and prominent integrity risks. Hunan hi tech venture capital group constructs and improves the "1 + 3" supervision system: "1" refers to the heart to heart talk between the Secretary of the Party committee, the deputy secretary and the Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission; "3" refers to the implementation of vertical supervision of discipline inspection, finance and legal affairs, and the establishment of a joint inspection team every year to conduct irregular comprehensive inspection of secondary companies. Implement the elimination mechanism of institutions and managers. For those who fail to complete the task indicators or even suffer losses, especially for those companies that have suffered losses for three consecutive years and have no hope of turning around the losses, timely classify and integrate or eliminate and exit, integrate two secondary companies and eliminate and exit one; We will comprehensively implement the system of competitive appointment, final adjustment and incompetent withdrawal of managers, and eliminate the "top leaders" of secondary companies