The warning brought by two cases of "common sense failure": how far is the training ground from the battlefield? Let the "common sense defeat" fade out of the drill ground Since the start of the training in the new year, all units have been in full swing to prepare for war, including confrontational exercises and inspection assessments. From the results, although a kind of "defeat" has attracted the attention of grass-roots officers and soldiers, it often makes people feel incredible when exploring the causes. These reasons include but are not limited to: grenade throwing only pays attention to distance and ignores concealment and camouflage; Battlefield rescue only pays attention to speed, ignoring the situation of the wounded; Live firing only pays attention to accuracy and ignores the tactical background... I believe that even laymen who do not understand military affairs will see the problem. Then, after years of professional training, why do officers and soldiers still make such low-level mistakes, leading to "common sense failure"? Is it really just because they didn't notice? With the deepening of the coupling of combat and training, all units are working hard to get close to the actual combat to the greatest extent. For this reason, some officers and soldiers will have the illusion from time to time that the real battlefield is what they are experiencing now. If their training meets the outline standards in peacetime, they will naturally have the ability to win the future battlefield. This is not the case. Although we often say that the examination room is the battlefield and the training ground is the battlefield, this is more a requirement of ideology. In practical work, no matter how close to the actual combat, it can not be equated with the actual combat. The long-term peaceful training environment without enemy information, as well as the resulting various training modes and training routines, can easily make officers and soldiers feel that it is enough to meet a certain "paper standard". Once they enter a complex and unfamiliar battlefield environment, they are often subject to inertial thinking and are difficult to see farther and think deeper, so there is a puzzling "common sense failure". How far is the drill ground from the battlefield? How far is a soldier from winning the war? To answer these two questions well, we must first start with mastering the basic concepts, basic skills and basic tactics, find the crux of habitual mistakes in performance and training, and then completely avoid this "common sense failure". Without this, it is hard to say that the combat effectiveness level of the army will be substantially improved. In this issue, "special attention" selects two cases of "common sense defeat" of the 71st group army, hoping to bring warning and inspiration to you. How can we attack when vehicles are damaged ■ Liu Renhao, Chen Kebin and Gao Junfeng, special correspondent of PLA Daily In mid spring, in the hinterland of eastern Anhui, a red blue confrontation drill was in full swing. Deng JIhang, the platoon leader of the assault company of the Fourth Battalion of a brigade of the 71st group army, commanded the whole platoon to break through the obstacles and successfully occupy a highland, pushing the fierce battle to a climax. Just as Deng JIhang adjusted his deployment and prepared to launch an attack in depth, Jin Fei, the director and dispatcher on one side, decided that they had lost the battle: "the vehicles were damaged and organized the attack without restoring combat effectiveness, which did not meet the actual combat requirements..." It turned out that the fire control system failed and the water tank was damaged when a assault vehicle in the platoon was attacked by the "enemy" artillery. Knowing that the rear support personnel could not arrive in time, Deng JIhang organized the crew to rush repair the chariot. However, due to limited maintenance equipment and time constraints, they only repaired the water tank. "In any case, there is no live ammunition in the drill, and the fire control system can fight with faults." In order to complete the attack task as soon as possible, Deng JIhang commanded the assault vehicle that could not carry out live fire to continue the impact, so he was sentenced to failure. "To let the chariots that have lost their Firepower Strike ability continue to charge is tantamount to sending 'live targets' to the enemy, causing unnecessary casualties." At the review meeting, the battalion commander Cheng Qian pointed out the reason for the defeat. "The correct way to deal with it is to command the damaged vehicles to join the rear repair team as soon as possible and put them into battle after the combat effectiveness is restored." "The actual combat drill must firmly establish the battlefield thinking and take it for granted." One stone aroused thousands of waves. The defeat caused the officers and soldiers to think deeply and made all the commanders and soldiers of the brigade realize that there are still many "peace ideas" and "peace routines" to be eliminated in the preparation for war. To this end, the brigade strictly examined and evaluated the criteria, carefully studied the exercise plan, checked and filled the gaps, supplemented and revised some exercise rules that were divorced from actual combat, and carried out the activity of "finding the accumulated disadvantages of peace in training" throughout the brigade to guide officers and soldiers to deeply reflect on the problems that did not meet the requirements of actual combat in training. The bad habits of only seeking speed and ignoring the enemy's situation in field rescue, only hitting fixed targets in tactical shooting, and only crossing obstacles without aiming in driving training have been corrected one by one. Today, the brigade has organized an experimental combat readiness pull drill, and it has become normal for the guidance and dispatching team to make random situations and set up dangerous situations, forcing officers and soldiers to strengthen battlefield awareness and improve battlefield emergency response ability in thinking about war and planning. Water pollution, how can you drink without inspection ■ Chang Jun, Jiang binyao "Poison craters were found at the confluence of the river ahead. The scouts quickly came out and carried out detection." Not long ago, the "Linfen brigade" of the 71st group army organized a single soldier and single equipment inspection and assessment as planned. After being attacked by the "enemy" chemical weapons, Wu Wang, the leader of the combat team of the reconnaissance battalion, immediately organized the team members to protect, observe and judge drugs. Then, the assessment enters the field survival link. Camping in the field, making simple filter devices, making fire and cooking... The team members are busy but not disorderly, and their actions are crisp and neat. However, just as they were ready to rush to the next task point, they were ruled out: "the personnel were poisoned and all the team were 'killed'!" "The field survival operation is correct, and the food selection is safe and reasonable. How can it be poisoned?" Wu Wang and the group members found the examiner with puzzlement. The examiner's answer made them speechless: "you are near the site of chemical weapon attack, but you have not tested the toxicity of the water source. You just drink it directly after simple filtration. If it was in a real battlefield, you would have died!" At the resumption meeting, the experience of Wu Wang's group aroused heated discussion among officers and soldiers. Some people believe that there are poison craters at the confluence of the river, which is too hidden for the combat team to notice; It was also pointed out that in order to get water nearby for convenience and time saving, the whole battlefield environment and combat process were ignored. In the final analysis, it was still due to weak awareness of actual combat and inertial thinking "The battlefield is changeable and cruel. The enemy will not attack according to our assumptions, and the enemy's situation cannot be fully predicted by us. If we want to win the future war, we must regard every training assessment as a real battle." In view of the vague understanding of a small number of officers and soldiers, the leaders of the brigade pointed out the crux and asked everyone to firmly establish the battlefield consciousness and completely abandon the idea of "training for examination and training for observation". To this end, they organized officers and soldiers to discuss the theme of "if you go to the battlefield tomorrow", sorted out more than 20 opinions and suggestions close to the actual combat, and set up a military training assessment and supervision team to deeply find the shortcomings and weaknesses existing in the battalion company group training. Bomb throwing training, blindly pursuing the throwing distance, resulting in excessive exposure of the body; Wear gas mask training, blindly seeking speed regardless of whether it is sealed; All kinds of mistakes in battlefield training were not corrected due to lack of awareness of light control and lack of time limit in daily training. (outlook new era)