Life is like opening a blind box. I don't know which one will come first. The same is true for start-ups. In 2021, we saw too much bad news in the market - in July, the double reduction policy was released, k12 education earthquake, and a large number of education start-ups went bankrupt; Then, a number of Unicorn companies such as oil network, yunniao distribution and Baiteng automobile exploded one after another. According to the data of it orange death company database, by December 2021, 816 Chinese companies had declared bankruptcy and shutdown, of which 143 companies had obtained financing, accounting for 17%. More painful than statistics are some real and living death cases. Starting from the cases of bankrupt companies, this paper interprets 10 typical cases of bankruptcy in 2021: some of them burned $400 million and finally went bankrupt; Some of them won the support of Yu Minhong, Gan Jiawei and other big men, but closed down quietly; Some were also toppled by the blessing of Sequoia China and IDG capital; Some projects eventually withdrew from the historical stage after being pocketed by Alibaba for 8 years; Some companies are unwilling to live or die, and have struggled to save themselves, but they are unable to return to heaven after all; Some founders started a business for six years, but ended up being sentenced and losing personal freedom. These bloody cases are worth pondering: what makes these once commendable star companies go bankrupt? We can find the main reasons for their business failure from the aspects of business model, policy, market environment, enterprise strategy and so on. Living in the same way, the community buys the first fallen unicorn In the early morning of July 6 this year, he Pengyu, founder and CEO of Tongcheng life, announced that Tongcheng life gave up the original community group purchase business and started a new brand name "honey orange life" to cut into the supply chain service. However, on the evening of the second day, honey orange life announced that the company decided to apply for bankruptcy because of its poor management over the past few years and was still unable to get rid of its business difficulties despite various efforts. Tongcheng life, founded in January 2018, has obtained eight rounds of investment in three years, with a total financing amount of nearly US $400 million. The investors include Tongcheng capital, Tencent and Jinshajiang venture capital. It is also a few players supported by giants in the community group buying track. Such a beautiful star enterprise applied for bankruptcy on the second day of announcing its name change, with a survival time of three and a half years. What are the reasons for its business failure? We have analyzed it from the aspects of internal and external factors, business model, policy, market environment and enterprise strategy. There are the following points: ① Community group buying is a protracted war. Originally, capital thought that opening the community group purchase subsidy war would be the same as the result of the taxi subsidy war. Although it was very expensive, it could be decided quickly and "see the result within a year". 2020 is the most competitive year for community group buying. In June, Tongcheng life won the highest financing in its history, US $200 million. However, on the one hand, the giants ended in person, and the top players continued to obtain huge financing supplies, resulting in intensified competition; On the other hand, a year later, the war is still stalemate, and the victory of a single enterprise is still far away. Community group buying has become a protracted war. Capital can only bet on the leader of the industry and gradually give up the second and third. ② The unit price of fresh group purchase is low, and the enterprise continues to suffer losses. Community group buying enterprises attract traffic with low-cost fresh group buying and madly subsidize users; In the case of extremely low customer unit price, it also faces problems such as fresh loss and refund, resulting in extremely low profits and continuous losses in the industry. If there is no continuous capital input, community group buying enterprises will be unsustainable. ③ Ambition does not match strength, which brings hidden dangers after rapid expansion through acquisition. Tongcheng started his life in Jiangsu, but he was not willing to settle in a corner, but accelerated his expansion to the whole country. In December 2018, Tongcheng life entered the South China market through M & A of Guangzhou qianxianhui; In September 2019, koala selection was acquired and renamed Tongcheng life selection, laying out Hunan and surrounding markets; In August 2020, the group purchase platform of Suzhou local community Linyi was incorporated into Tongcheng life. M & A has brought about the rapid expansion of the scale, the number of employees living on the same journey has surged to 6000, and the human and operating costs have soared, which is in urgent need of higher growth. At the same time, it also faces greater competition. For example, Hunan is the preferred place of prosperity, and life on the same journey may not occupy a favorable advantage. In April this year, Tongcheng life withdrew from the Hunan market. ④ Strong policy supervision. In December 2020, the regulatory authorities issued a document requiring community group buying not to abuse the "nine prohibitions" such as independent pricing power. Under the strengthened supervision of the policy, the Internet play of community group buying by subsidizing "pulling heads" has gradually failed. ⑤ The epidemic dividend disappeared and the order volume fell. The outbreak of the national epidemic in early 2020 has cultivated users' habit of online shopping for fresh food and stimulated the vitality of community group buying. However, after that, the popularization of vaccine accelerated, the epidemic became stable, and the order volume declined after the dividend disappeared. The bankruptcy of Tongcheng life accelerated the reshuffle of the whole community group buying industry, and then the food club was closed. Extended reading: community group buying retreat Yi 23, the last player to share the wardrobe On August 15, 2021, Yi 23, the head enterprise of the shared wardrobe track, closed the service and ended the operation. Liu Mengyuan, founder and CEO of yiersan, is a senior fashion media person. She has founded TV programs such as bazaar TV, the first fashion and top model. In 2015, the sharing economy was in full swing. Liu Mengyuan devoted herself to entrepreneurship. In that year, she founded Yi 23, which provides members with clothing rental services, known as "shared Wardrobe". According to it orange data, yiersan has completed six rounds of financing, with a total financing amount of about 738 million yuan. The investors include angel investor Wang Gang, Jinshajiang venture capital, IDG capital, Qingliu capital, Sina Weibo fund, Alibaba, Sequoia China, etc. Yi 23's original intention is very beautiful, but the reality is very skinny. Its failure lies more in the business model and the market itself: ① Renting clothes is still a niche market in China. At the subconscious level of Chinese people, our relationship with goods tends to have rather than share. Clothing rental is an immature model in China. Generally, the use scenarios of renting clothes acceptable to the mass market are limited, such as wedding dresses, banquet gowns and other special occasions. The frequency of use is very low, but the texture of clothes is highly required. Women who can accept renting clothes for daily work and commuting are relatively small. ② The cost of renting clothes is not lower than the cost of buying clothes, or even higher. Clothing 23 is light and luxurious. The audience is urban white-collar women aged 22 ~ 35. The average tag price of clothes is 1500 yuan. To become a member of yi23, you need to pay a membership fee of 499 yuan per month, and new users have a discount in the first month. At first, young women will have a taste. But once the freshness is over, it is inevitable to calculate an account - 25-year-old + migrant workers spend nearly 6000 yuan a year on renting clothes. They can only experience but can't wear them again. It's very wasteful and uneconomical. It's better to buy more pieces with high utilization rate. This will lead to a very short life cycle of yiersan members. The loss of old members is fast and the retention rate is low. It needs to be constantly updated to balance the cost. ③ The user experience is not equal, and the platform seeks profits at the expense of user interests. Yi 23 members can only rent three clothes at a time, and the quantity is constant, but the quality and experience depend on the platform. In the first two years of its establishment, yiersan has a strong development momentum, more financing, and the quality of platform clothes is guaranteed. However, after 2018, the service experience of clothes 2 and 3 has been greatly reduced: for example, the platform considers changing the rules without authorization in order to make profits, and the interval between members placing the second order has been changed from 48 hours to 3 days after signing in for clothes; Quality problems such as deterioration and dirt of clothes; Cooperative Logistics has changed from SF express round-trip to other express and SF mix and match, resulting in longer express timeliness and so on. In May 2019, yiersan announced to turn losses into profits and realize overall profits. In fact, this is a common problem of many wardrobe companies. When they make complaints about profitability, they choose to sacrifice their interests and experience, and become the most serious disaster area. The first mock exam and other similar projects were closed a few years ago. The two or three has been 6 years of life, and has been the longest game player who shared the wardrobe. The fall of the same is the same as declaring that this mode is not established in the current market. Extended reading: "burning ALI / Softbank and other 1.2 billion, the track is completely cold" Shrimp music, Ali closed after 8 years of acquisition On February 5, 2021, shrimp music stopped its service and ended. Shrimp music, which has been established for 13 years and acquired by Alibaba for 8 years, no longer exists. Shrimp music, as an old music player, has millions of users, and was pocketed by Ali early, backed by giants. Why can't it escape death in the end? ① The copyright of digital music has grown from nothing, and the competition for copyright is becoming more and more intense. Shrimp music was founded in the early days, when the Internet was still wild. Until after 2015, the policy issued a document, and digital music established its copyright status. The competition for copyright among giants has intensified, and wechat has also "blocked" links to shrimp music. In 2015 and 2016, the cost of music copyright rose, and Ali spared no expense to sign exclusive copyright cooperation with rolling stone music and Huayan international. But soon, planet Ali announced its shutdown. Later, people familiar with the matter said, "the KPI of shrimp is that the cost should be low, and in the end, you can't buy good content." In this battle in the field of digital music, Ali lost to Tencent after all. ② The "feelings" and "small and beautiful" of shrimp music can not carry Ali's big dream. The founder team of shrimp music started a business because they really loved music, adhered to the essence of music, and has been recognized by music fans in terms of professionalism, accuracy of recommendation, detailed classification and complete music library. The original intention of shrimp music is to be a professional music content discovery and consumption platform to support the creation of independent musicians. However, after being acquired by Ali, shrimp music lost its independent decision-making power and needed to obey the grand strategy of Ali group. In July 2015, Ali integrated shrimp music and everyday sounds to form Ali music group. In April 2016, Ali planet app released by Ali music moved from professional style to popularization, blindly pursuing "large and comprehensive". However, it is hard to say that this strategy is wrong, but Ali did not well implement this strategy and achieve expectations. Chen Rui, chairman and CEO of station B, believes that "small and beautiful can not coexist with development and growth. If station B does not move forward, it will decline more and more." So far, in the world of Chinese Internet, only Douban may still adhere to "small and beautiful". ③ When shrimp music changed its flavor, users quickly lost and then turned to other digital music platforms. When shrimp music was "tossing around", Netease cloud music, which was once an opponent it could not see, was "quietly rising". According to QM data, in July 2017, shrimp music had 2.29 million daily live users, while Netease cloud music had 15.52 million daily live users. The reason is that after the dried shrimps taste bad, they no longer advocate and support independent musicians, and a large number of independent musicians no longer use dried shrimps and change the platform. When users continue to drain, the value of shrimp becomes smaller and smaller, and finally becomes an abandoned child in Ali system. Extended reading: Ali's 40 billion investment mistakes at the beginning,