On October 20, Qinghai Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision announced that Yin Xuejun, former director of Yushu Grain Reserve Bank of Qinghai Province, was subject to review and investigation. Prior to this, the Jilin Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision announced that fan tiewen, director of Jilin Yitong Sandao grain collection and storage warehouse, and Li Xiaohong, deputy director, were subject to review and investigation; The supervision committee of Wuxi Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection of Jiangsu Province reported three corruption cases of "relying on food", of which two cases of serious violation of discipline and law were the directors of grain depots. Food security is more important than Mount Tai, not only in planting and harvesting, but also in storage and management. With the special rectification of corruption in the field of grain purchase and sales carried out all over the country, several grass-roots grain depot directors were investigated and dealt with on suspicion of serious violations of discipline and law. What are the main manifestations of these grain depot moths? Why do they succeed frequently when they are not good at corruption? In view of the system and regulatory loopholes exposed by the case, how to promote reform and governance with the case? Drawing: Wang Chan text: Han Yadong 1. Misappropriated 13.9 million yuan of wheat return payment to fry futures, purchased grain through a third-party company, illegally accepted bribes by taking advantage of his position... A number of grain depot moths were removed in the special rectification Grass roots grain depots related to national food security have been frequently involved in recent cases. On October 13, the supervision committee of Jiangsu Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection reported some cases of Wang Yongzhong, former director of Nancao grain depot in Yixing City, suspected of serious violation of discipline and Law: in March 2016, Wang Yongzhong arbitrarily used part of the returned payment of wheat entrusted by Nancao grain depot for personal futures trading. After huge losses, he borrowed a large amount of money from individuals and enterprises in the name of Nancao grain depot, Pay the return payment for wheat. On October 18, the supervision committee of Wuxi Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection of Jiangsu Province informed Kong Weimin, Xu Longming and others of the problem of "relying on food". According to the circular, from 2009 to 2016, Kong Weimin, while serving as the director of Xinzha grain depot of Jiangyin Grain Bureau and Jiangyin baiqugang grain reserve depot, indirectly increased the price of grain purchased through a third-party company, resulting in a national financial loss of more than 9.27 million yuan; From 2011 to 2015, Kong Weimin conspired with others to defraud more than 358000 yuan of funds by falsifying the deposit and custody fees for illegal meals, alcohol and tobacco purchases, shopping cards, etc. From 2006 to 2012, Xu Longming, former director of Wuxi Xin'an National Grain Reserve, took advantage of his position to illegally accept bribes from seven management service objects, totaling 385000 yuan. From the case, the key links in the operation of grass-roots grain depots, such as grain purchase, storage, sales and rotation, are prone to grain related corruption. In addition, grain circulation facilities, reserve infrastructure and investment project construction at all levels are also prone to corruption. For example, fan Shengliang, former member of the Party committee of Sichuan grain and oil wholesale center and former director of the directly affiliated reserve depot, not only reaped benefits in the links of grain purchase and sales and rotation, but also received millions of yuan of "care fees" from the project contractor through various engineering projects such as the construction of fluorocarbon paint for edible oil tanks in the directly affiliated depot. From the plot of the case, some grain depot "rats" are bold, greedy, commit crimes for a long time, many times and a large amount of money. Some regard the national grain depot as a private enterprise and engage in "paternalism" in internal management. For example, Yu Zhigang, the former director of the grain management office in Shiling Town, Huadu District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, has served as the director for more than 20 years, taking the rent and compensation of public property as their own, turning the enterprise into a personal ATM. Some internal and external collusion, gang crime, "collapse mode corruption" occurs from time to time, such as the corruption nest case at the grass-roots grain station in Yizheng City, Jiangsu Province, and 14 webmasters of 15 grass-roots grain stations were investigated. Kong Xiangzhi, a professor at the school of agriculture and rural development of Renmin University of China, told reporters that food security is not only a matter of production, but also an important part of food security. China attaches great importance to food security and has established a relatively perfect food reserve system. Good grain reserves are an important backing to ensure grain supply and an important measure to stabilize grain prices and prepare for famine years. "Grain reserve is like air. I can't feel its existence at ordinary times, but I can't leave it all the time." "Grain depots are the most commonly used facilities for storing grain. It is the so-called 'solid warehouses make the world safe'. The occurrence of corruption cases in some grass-roots grain depots directly infringes on the interests of grass-roots farmers, seriously erodes the foundation of food security and causes serious losses to the country. We must strictly investigate and deal with them," Kong Xiangzhi said. The problem of relying on grain is the most prominent, which has become the focus of deep excavation and detailed investigation in all localities Combing the cases of various localities, the six types of corruption problems of "relying on grain to eat food", such as "circular grain", "air grain", "rising and overflow grain", "loss grain", "price difference grain" and "pit agricultural grain", are the most typical, which has become the focus of deep investigation in various localities. "Revolving grain" means that in the process of implementing the national policy grain collection, storage and reserve grain rotation, improper benefits are obtained by means of virtual purchase and virtual sales, Chen Dingxin and no rotation report, with the help of immovable inventory, book rotation or simultaneous rotation of inventory and book. This is the most important way of "relying on grain to eat food" at present. For example, Tao Yonghong, the former general manager of Sichuan Qingshen County State Grain Management Co., Ltd., colluded with grain merchants to sell 1276 tons of rice at the price of old grain, and then repurchase 896 tons of old grain. However, the book is calculated according to new grain, and the price difference of 200000 yuan between "new" and "Chen" is easily bagged. Many indicators of this batch of aged grain are unqualified and can only be used to produce feed, but no one cares. The "air grain" created out of nothing between grain depots and grain merchants, between grain depots or within grain depots can be regarded as an upgraded version of "circular grain", which can be roughly divided into three categories: first, the grain depots and grain merchants signed false grain purchase and sales contracts, forged grain warehousing and warehousing documents, mutual accounting of funds, and created the illusion of transaction; Second, the grain depots signed false grain purchase and sales contracts, forged grain warehousing and warehousing documents and issued invoices, but there was no weight check sheet or weighing sheet. The two transactions were written off, and there was no real capital flow; Third, the grain depot creates the appearance of false rotation through financial treatment. Similarly, Tao Yonghong, in order to cover up the problem of 1047 tons of empty warehouse in a grain depot caused by his unauthorized misappropriation of grain reserves, did not hesitate to fabricate the list of food and agriculture workers, forge accounting vouchers, and collude with grain merchants to sign a false contract for 1047 tons of "air grain". The money for grain purchase returned to the owner after "walking" around the book. "Grain surplus" refers to the surplus generated by deducting water impurities and drying, ventilation and humidification in the process of grain purchase, warehousing, storage, transportation and delivery. This is a normal phenomenon, but some people hide and privately sell "Shengyi grain" and misappropriate grain money by not counting it into the inventory accounts. For example, Tan Weidong, former director of Shaobo grain depot in Jiangdu District, Yangzhou City, Jiangsu Province, took advantage of his position to sell the "Shengyi grain" that should have been reported privately and embezzled 437000 yuan of grain funds. According to the investigators, the settlement of grain funds is generally accurate to Jiao and Fen. If there is a large amount of income with small change in the bank flow of relevant individuals such as grain depot principals, custodians and financial personnel, it is likely to sell "Sheng excess grain" to grain enterprises privately. In addition, in the process of grain purchase, storage and transportation, the vast majority of grass-roots grain stations will produce "grain rise and overflow", and there are few grain mildew losses due to poor storage. We should focus on the blank account and loss account of "grain rise and overflow" in the accounts of grain depots. The usual tactics of "relying on grain to eat food" also include "lost grain" to obtain funds by falsely increasing the amount of grain loss, illegal reselling of government reserve grain, high selling and low buying "price difference grain" to earn price difference, and "pit agricultural grain" that directly infringes on the vital interests of the masses, especially "pit agricultural grain". "Pit agricultural grain" means that in the process of grain purchase, they pit and damage farmers and obtain illegitimate interests through improper means such as cutting weight, reducing grade and price, defaulting on grain funds, and increasing the rate of grain moisture, impurities and mildew. Gao Shilin, the former head of Chenji grain station of Yizheng grain purchase and Marketing Corporation of Jiangsu Province, settled with farmers with third-class grain and municipal grain purchase and Marketing Corporation with second-class grain by pressing the grade and price, so as to obtain a price difference of more than 100000 yuan. Corruption cases in grass-roots grain depots have exposed loopholes and hidden dangers in grain purchase, storage and operation in some places, and shortcomings in system construction, daily supervision and personnel use By analyzing relevant cases, it can be found that some grain depot moths are not good at corruption, but they can succeed repeatedly, and can not be effectively corrected for a long time. This has exposed loopholes and hidden dangers in grain purchase, storage and operation in some local grain systems, and shortcomings in system construction, daily supervision and personnel use. Taking Tan Weidong as an example, his "relying on grain for food" has lasted for more than 6 years, involving embezzlement of "rising and overflowing grain", false reporting of expenditure, less recording of grain sales revenue and so on. Zhang Jun, deputy secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and deputy director of the supervision commission of Jiangdu District, Yangzhou City, analyzed that the identity of the director of the grain depot enabled Tan Weidong to fill his own pockets in the process of grain purchase, arbitrarily destroy the unit's accounting management system, and have no constraints on the use of unit funds. The specific performance is that "more deduction and less reporting" are adopted by means of "discount" and "discount" when purchasing grain; Increase the proportion of grain moisture, impurities and mildew to form "rising and overflowing grain"; Appointing his wife as the cash accountant of the grain station, wantonly hindering the normal supervision of the accountant appointed by the superior; Some grain income is not recorded, and unit funds are put into personal pockets. The case shows that the "gatekeepers" of some grass-roots grain depots are small and powerful, the power is too centralized, and the internal management is "one word". For example, the director of the grain depot has great autonomy in grain purchase, storage and sales. Distinguishing between old and new grains and identifying grain grades mainly rely on manual operation. In fact, it is freely agreed by the team members; Internal selection and employment are optional. Some directly let their spouses be responsible for finance, some privately hire personnel to be responsible for outsourcing and export business, and some resigned personnel control the operation of grain depots behind the scenes; The financial management of the unit is chaotic, the appointed accountant is in vain, the use of personal bank cards is rampant, there is no distinction between public and private, the grain collection and storage funds have been separated from supervision for a long time, the operating profits remain outside the account, and discipline and law violations such as corruption and misappropriation of public funds are common. Some grass-roots grain depots have chaotic management, weak internal supervision and restriction, and external supervision is difficult. Wang Hongwei, member of the Standing Committee of Fengxian county Party committee, Secretary of the County Commission for Discipline Inspection and director of the supervision committee, Xuzhou City, Jiangsu Province, for example, said that according to the division of labor, the quality of grain is controlled by the quality inspector, the quantity is controlled by the weigher, and the warehouse keeper rechecks the grain. The management of some grass-roots grain depots is chaotic. Most of the personnel in key positions such as quality inspector, weigher and storekeeper are relatives, acquaintances and villagers, Easy to collude. It is difficult for the competent grain authorities to effectively implement their responsibilities for the supervision of grain reserves, quality and safety. The grain administrative department attaches importance to business and neglects management. The system formulated for the grain management of grain depots is a mere formality, especially the supervision on finance and operation is not enough, and there is a lack of operable management means. In addition, some grain depot cadres do not have a strong sense of discipline and law-abiding. According to Zhang Jun, the Party member organization relationship of some local grass-roots grain depots and grain and oil management offices is in villages and towns, the personnel and labor relationship is in the district grain collection and Storage Corporation, and the district grain and material reserve bureau and grain collection and Storage Corporation fail to give proper inspection and guidance to the party construction of grass-roots grain depots and grain and oil management offices, resulting in abnormal political life within the Party of some grain depots and grain and oil management offices