A few days ago, the 13th round of commander level talks between the Chinese and Indian armies broke up unhappily. The spokesman of China's Western Theater clearly pointed out that "India still adheres to unreasonable and unrealistic requirements" and "I hope India will not misjudge the situation". This is the second time since the sixth round of military commander level talks that China and India have issued statements with different caliber (the last time was the eleventh round), and it is also the strongest criticism of China on India's "still adhering to unreasonable and unrealistic requirements". From the new round of hype of Indian public opinion on the Sino Indian border situation recently, to the repeated and exorbitant prices of Indian military and political departments in the negotiations, it shows that India does not really take the negotiations as a way to ease the situation and solve problems, but as a tool to show strength to China and seek the maximization of unreasonable claims. So, what are India's "misjudgments" about the situation? What are the "demons" who constantly show strength and are unwilling to compromise on the border issue? First, it overestimates the opportunities provided by China US strategic competition. Since China's defeat in the self-defense counterattack against India in 1962, Indian strategic circles have been seeking to rely on external forces to check and balance China, and the United States has always been the preferred target for India to rely on. However, under the general pattern of the cold war, the focus of the United States' global strategy was the Soviet Union, and its attitude towards India, which had close relations with the Soviet Union, was ambiguous; Especially after the improvement of Sino US relations in the 1970s, India's value in the U.S. strategy towards China decreased, and India also fell more to the Soviet Union. After the end of the cold war, India once sought to improve relations with major forces, including China and the United States, and was unwilling to choose sides too obviously. However, in recent years, with the United States characterizing China as a strategic competitor, India believes that "the opportunity is coming", which can not only seek benefits by selling its own value to the United States to check and balance China, but also improve its ability to compete with China with the support of the United States. Does India's tough stance on the border issue have nothing to do with the Indian leader's visit to the United States at the end of September and his participation in the quadrilateral summit of the United States, Japan, India and Australia? Second, it underestimates China's determination, will and ability to safeguard national sovereignty. Many people in India's strategic circles believe that the international environment currently facing India is superior to China; China is under the strategic pressure of the United States, while India is good at dancing on the international stage and among major powers. In this case, India tends to think that no matter how it tosses, China will not and can't do anything about it, because China needs to "hold and stabilize India". It is true that China hopes to develop stable and good bilateral relations with India, but this does not mean that China will condone India's advance, let alone make any concession in the core interests of territorial sovereignty. Third, they lost their interest demands on the border issue. Although there is no official statement on India's "unreasonable and unrealistic requirements", it can be found by combing India's official statements and public opinion reports that India stubbornly demands that China restore the so-called state before April 2020, which is tantamount to denying China's infrastructure construction on its territory. If India's logic is followed, will China take the line of actual control on November 7, 1959 as the basis for negotiations? Should India abolish the so-called "Arunachal Pradesh" (Southern Tibet) and the "Ladakh central region" and "Kashmir central region" established in 2019 be the premise of negotiations? Obviously, India has not made clear its "interest boundary" on the border issue, and is still engaged in the "encroachment policy" and "forward policy" that have been proved wrong during the Nehru Period. The border issue is the biggest obstacle to the improvement of China India relations. India's insistence on showing strength to China on border issues will not only have a far-reaching negative impact on the mutual understanding of the two peoples, hinder the overall development of bilateral relations, but also harm India's own national security and development. From the perspective of bottom line thinking, if we can't get rid of the "devil" on the border issue between China and India, it will be difficult for India to realize its "great power dream". The most obvious cost is that India has invested a lot of resources that could have been used to promote domestic development on the border between China and India, resulting in unnecessary consumption of national resources. After the conflict in the kalwan Valley in 2020, India will deploy a large number of military forces to the front line of China India border, and increase arms procurement, which will cause huge consumption of financial, human and material resources for India. India's economy has been in the predicament of the government's willful reform over the past few years and the impact of the COVID-19 since 2020. However, the India government has continued to increase the "non productive consumption" of the military deployment in the border areas, which will no doubt further occupy the resources available in the economic and social fields and make India's economy more frost free. If considering that India still needs to invest a lot of military power in Pakistan, India's unnecessary resource consumption due to its tough foreign policy is even greater. In addition, about 75% of India's military spending goes to daily consumption such as military wages, allowances and weapons maintenance. Consuming a large amount of military resources on the China India border will also crowd out its ability to modernize weapons and equipment and damage its long-term military modernization process. India should have coordinated security and development, but showing too much strength to China may make it neither win security nor promote development. The most strategic price is that India is bound by the US strategy towards China, but eventually ends up being abandoned. In recent years, India's high-level and strategic circles have continuously released the signals of "using the United States to control China" and "uniting with the United States to curb China", and have also continuously strengthened defense and security cooperation with the United States in policy practice. This will lead to two serious consequences: first, the relationship between India and China is at an impasse, and India also deals with its relations with its neighbors from the perspective of confrontation with China, thus substantially deteriorating India's surrounding security environment; Second, India has made excessive bets on the United States, but the foreign policy of the United States has always been "America first", and India may become a "strategic outcast" due to the adjustment of American policy. The last price we want to see is that India's provocation against China has triggered a gun fire and even a military conflict, which has a serious impact on India's domestic politics and external environment. China hopes to work with India to maintain peace and tranquility in the border area. However, from the Indian army's violent attack on Chinese officers and soldiers in the kalwan Valley conflict last year, and the subsequent Indian army's shooting into the air to deter Chinese officers and soldiers, India is changing its way of handling the Sino Indian border confrontation, and its actions in the border area are more risky. A few years ago, India conducted cross-border "surgical" military operations against Pakistan, which is in line with its tough position on the Sino Indian border issue, which makes people worry about whether India will engage in "military adventurism". During the Nehru Period, India misjudged China's determination and will to safeguard sovereignty and engaged in the so-called "forward policy", which resulted in China's self-defense counterattack against India, and Nehru's own political career also suffered a disastrous impact. Taking history as a mirror, if India makes actions in the border areas that may lead to miscarriage of justice, fire and even more serious situations, is India ready to bear the consequences? (written by Lou Chunhao, deputy director of South Asia Research Institute of China Academy of modern international relations) (outlook new era)